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RURAL NON-FARM ENTERPRISE IN THE SOVIET UNION 
Introduction 
The major concern of Soviet agriculture is to increase production of basic crops such as 
grain, dairy products, meat and vegetables. Sugar beet is the only major crop where 
present production is not considered insufficient, and even the most casual experience of 
shopping for foodstuffs in any Russian town demonstrates that basic items such as 
bread, apples, beef or cheese, are in short supply. The current five year plan includes 
production increases of 19% for grain and around 25% for dairy products, and, as in so 
many fields of the economy, comparative data of consumption per head between the 
USSR and the USA are used to press the case for continued expansion. The massive 
purchases of grain from abroad, and even the recent imports of surplus butter at give- 
away prices from the EEC are viewed as a national disgrace; national self-sufficiency, 
and even some export capacity, are perceived to be the overall goals. 
At the institutional level, this concern has recently been reflected in the formation of 
Gosagroprom, the so-called “Agro-Industrial Complex”, which attempts to bring under 
one authority all the various sectors which can contribute to the achievement of targets, 
such as machinery and fertilizer production and distribution, as well as farming itself. 
There are still quite separate departments at the national, regional and district level for 
state and collective farms, although the distinction between them, which is largely 
historical in origin, is coming to mean less and less in day to day operational terms. 
In spite of the fact that no new collective farms have been formed since the 
collectivisation of the Baltic States soon after the war, the collectives are still the focus 
of some international attention, and indeed of some emulation in those countries in 
Africa and elsewhere which are attempting to pursue a so-called socialist or even a 
mixed approach to development. Although the Soviet collectives have not been an 
enormous success in terms of increased productivity, and their results are in the 
aggregate very little different from the State Farms, they do nevertheless represent the 
largest and possibly the longest established group of co-operative enterprises anywhere; 
co-operatives are seen by many people in both the richer and poorer countries of the 
world as a possible third option to add to the classic choice between state and private 
ownership; it might be that the Soviet system, in spite of the special features inherent 
both in its origins and the system within which it currently operates, might have some 
valuable lessons for people elsewhere trying to introduce similar forms of ownership and 
control. 
During a recent short visit undertaken under the auspices of the Anglo-Soviet Cultural 
Agreement, I was able to spend a day in each of three collective farms and two state 
farms, in the area around Vladimir, some 200 kilometers east of Moscow, and between 
Krasnodar and the Sea of Azov, near the Black Sea. I also had extensive discussions with 
district and national headquarters staff, after the field visits, where it was possible to ask 
whether the impressions I gained from the individual cases were in any way typical of 
the country as a whole. I was able to obtain a great deal of information about the ways 
in which the farms were managed, and the degree of autonomy they enjoyed; I also 
observed some very interesting examples of non-farm economic activities being carried 
out by the collectives and the state farms. 
These non-farm activities are quite different and distinct from the very small private 
vegetable gardens and pig or cattle rearing activities of individual members. Some 
involved agricultural inputs or equipment, others were adding value to farm crops, while 
others appeared quite unrelated to, and even in some cases to be in conflict with the 
overall national objective of increasing production of basic crops. The farm managers 
were somewhat surprised by my interest in these activities, but were delighted to tell me 
about them, while the regional and particularly the national level officials were not only 
surprised but somewhat irritated by my interest; they clearly felt that national and 
individual production targets for basic crops and their achievement or otherwise, were of 
far greater importance. 
I felt nevertheless that these activities did merit some attention, and that they might be 
of interest to a wider public, particularly because they seemed to show how some Soviet 
farms have already begun to evolve solutions to the problems of over-production, rural 
de-population and the growing capital intensity of agriculture, long before those 
problems have become as serious as they have in Western Europe, North America or 
even many parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America. The Soviet initiatives have often 
been undertaken in response to quite different problems, and they are clearly unlikely to 
be immediately replicable in the context of the quite different systems of so called 
“mixed” or capitalist economies. They may nevertheless be of some relevance, both to the 
EEC and the USA as they struggle with overproduction, and to Third World rural 
development managers and planners. 
The Activities and Their OrinInq 
The non-agricultural enterprises which I saw, and about which I was sometimes 
reluctantly informed, appeared to fall very broadly into three different types, motivated 
by three rather different concerns. 
First, and possibly most obviously, there are downstream activities whereby the farm 
attempts to add more value to its crops, and thus to earn more surplus for further 
investment or for distribution to members in the annual bonus, which can be almost 
equal to the normal salary of a member in a successful year. These activities include 
canning and bottling of fruits, jam, fruit juice and similar products, and made use of 
crops which were either not subject to annual production quotas or where the farm 
could be quite confident that the quota would be comfortably exceeded, so that there 
would be no shortage of raw material for the processing facility. 
Second, there were activities which had been started because the farm needed products 
or services which would normally be provided by outside organisations, but where the 
level of quality, the reliability, the price or some other aspect was unsatisfactory. These 
included the manufacture of farm machinery, as opposed to its maintenance, which is in 
any case a farm responsibility, sewing sacks, extruding packaging material, making 
fencing equipment, operating sawmills, brick making, and a large range of what are 
often very specialised construction activities, such as land reclamation, road building and 
large scale building contracting, carried out initially for the farm itself, but increasingly 
serving a wider market of neighbouring farms, communities and other organisations. 
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Thirdly, and perhaps most interesting, there are a number of activities which have been 
undertaken because of the need to employ people. In some cases, and particularly in 
Vladimir District east of Moscow where crops are sown in early May and harvested in 
September, this is mainly a seasonal problem; elsewhere, such activities are initiated in 
order to provide employment for women, or for young people who may not wish, or 
have the experience, to fill the increasingly technical jobs on the farm itself. These 
activities include brush making, garment manufacture, electronic sub-assembly and 
plastic moulding of components for nearby engineering works. 
The original motive for starting the enterprise may have arisen from a combination of 
these three, but most of the non-farm activities I observed could be placed into one of 
the above categories. None of the managers to whom I spoke mentioned a fundamental 
shortage of employment on the farm, as opposed to seasonal inactivity or the problems 
of special groups of people. The farms are, however, communities as well as enterprises. 
The average farm occupies some 6000 hectares, of which 4000 are under cultivation, and 
there are around 500 working members, with a further 300 children, retired people and 
wives who work at home rather than on the farm or in other services. The managers 
appeared to feel very strongly that every member, every child of every member, and 
even the spouses of those who married outside the community should be able to have a 
job in the community. 
In some districts, maintenance or increase in the numbers of members counts towards 
the marks for the annual competition for the best farm, and the managers and their staff 
seemed to be anxious to make their farms self-sufficient not only in terms of inputs and 
services, but also in terms of employment for succeeding generations. They were aware 
that their enthusiasm for mechanisation would eventually lead to the displacement of 
labour on a far greater scale, and realised that their initial efforts at diversification 
might eventually have to be considerably extended; the precedents were set, in terms of 
members’ enthusiasm, and encouragement, or at least grudging acceptance by the 
planners, and they were optimistic that they would in this way be able to avoid many of 
the problems which have afflicted agricultural communities elsewhere, even when the 
national production targets have been achieved. 
I was only able to obtain somewhat random data as to the scale and profitability of these 
non-farming ac:+vities, at the national, regional or individual farm level, partly because I 
did not ask for it in my first visits and partly because data is not available, at the 
national level at any rate, on this type of activity which may be perceived as arising in 
part from the failure of the farm support system, and which is in any case not central to 
the overall goals of ever higher production. 
I was able, however, to obtain employment figures for the farm and the non-farm 
activitia,of Beysug and Russya Collective farms in Krasnodar District, for the Bolshevik 
Collective Farm in Vladimir District east of Moscow, and total figures for all the 80 
collective farms and 140 state farms in Vladimir District. I also obtained some 
comparative data for investment, profits and turnover for farm and non-farm activities 
in some of the above units. The figures, which were not able to be checked and may not 
be totally comparable, are briefly summarised in the following tables: 
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Employment 
Revenue 
Investment 
Profits 
1, TABLE *Pr n 
Beysug Russya Bolshevik Vladimir Vladimir 
Collectives State Farms 
2.8% 6% 2.5% 12% 10.4% 
3.6% na 25% 20% 19% 
1.3% na 3.4% 3.7% 3% 
2.6% 20% 20% na na 
These figures suggest that non-farm activities are more important in the more northern 
region as is to be expected because of the longer winter period; they also show the 
rather wide variation in the significance of such activities between one farm and 
another. They also demonstrate the rather greater profits that can be earned from a 
given capital investment, or person employed, in non-farm as opposed to farming 
activities. This may also be reasonable, since the farm profits are depressed by the sales 
of quota production which is sold to the State at low prices, and which might be taken 
to include some allowance for imputed rent of the land. It is clear, nevertheless, that 
profits, which appeared to be of great importance to the various managers whom I met, 
since they provide the farms with funds for reinvestment and for bonus distribution, can 
more easily be obtained through deploying both labour and capital in non-farm 
activities, once the all-important quotas have been met. 
The following even more scanty financial data suggest the greater profits, and lower cost 
per work place, of non-farm activities; one rouble is equal to approximately one pound 
sterling, at the official rate of exchange, and the investment figures do not include any 
allowance for the cost of land or of major irrigation works, 
centrally provided infrastructure. 
trunk roads or other 
CapitaP/Mb 
Total 
Non-Farm 
13600 
6250 
Profit/Job 
Total 
Non-Farm 
3600 
3250 
Sales/Job 
Total 10000 
Non- Farm 12500 
Beysug 
Rb 
TABLE 2: Comaarative Financial Data 
Russya Bolshevik Vladimir 
Collectives 
Rb Rb Rb 
12400 17000 20000 
na 22800 6200 
1900 2900 na 
6700 na na 
na 8800 8930 
na na 14700 
Vladimir 
State Farms 
Rb 
22000 
6500 
na 
na 
14700 
27700 
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It was only possible to obtain very limited information on the profitability in relation to 
sales and capital of the farm and the non-farm enterprises; for the Beysug Collective, 
the average profit on sales for all products is 36%, while the equivalent figure for the 
non-farm sales is twenty-six per cent. The comparison of the profit on investment, 
which is more significant in terms of the Collective’s decisions on allocation of 
resources, is, however, far more in favour of the non-farm enterprises; the average 
figure for all activities is well below that achieved by the non-farm ventures. 
The comparative figures for the collective and the state farms in Vladimir District also 
show that although collectives are nominally more autonomous and able to invest 
members’ labour and their own capital, in such activities as they wish, the state farms 
also enjoy similar freedom. Although the latter are nominally under the direct control of 
the district and higher echelon authorities, and their managers have, at least until very 
recently, been appointed from above, they appeared in conversation to have similar 
autonomy as the collective farm chairmen, who are elected by the members, and 
answerable to them. Both groups of managers appeared to think and regard themselves in 
much the same way as do managers of large autonomous units of decentralised 
diversified corporations, with the additional element of responsibility for the community 
as well as the economic activities. So long as they satisfied their ultimate masters by 
producing the crop quotas each year, and remained solvent, the day to day decisions and 
even medium to long term commitment of resources were up to them, even if they had 
nominally to be approved or included in the plan of a higher authority. One state farm 
which I visited was also the base for a large agricultural research station and the other 
also housed a district agricultural training college. In both cases, great care was taken to 
ensure that the farms remained independent profit centres, and the school and the 
research centre were properly charged for the space they occupied and for any costs 
which might be caused because of the need to accommodate normal economic farming 
practices to the needs of research or training. 
The Bolshevik Collective Farm Plastic Moulding Unit 
The Bolshevik Collective Farm occupies some 7300 hectares of sandy forest land near 
Murom, some 200 kilometers southe east of the district centre of Vladimir. About 3500 
hectares are cultivated, and the main crop is seed potatoes; they also raise heifers for 
sale to other farms in the district, and they produce milk whichis sold to the state dairy 
system. Approximately 60% of the potatoes are sold on quota to the state for around 
thirty roubles per hundred kilos; a further 20% are used on the farm and the balance of 
20% is sold on the free market, for around forty roubles per 100 kilos. 
There are about 2500 people, living in the main village where the farm headquarters and 
other service departments are located, and in five smaller villages elsewhere on the 
farm’s territory. Of these, some 1050 are fully employed on the farm and in its service 
and non-farm enterprises, while the others are either children, old people or are 
employed by the state in the schools, the health centre or other centrally provided social 
activities. The school and clinic buildings were built by the collective, but are staffed 
and run by the state. 
In addition to the agricultural activities, the farm employs about 100 members in a 
number of construction teams; these were started to serve the needs of the farm itself, 
but have recently carried out a number of contracts for neighbouring state and collective 
farms. There is also a well equipped workshop which was originally set up to maintain 
the farm’s own equipment; partly because of the long winter season, the workshop staff 
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moved from routine maintenance into total overhauls; its superintendent has recently 
designed and built a new loading system for crop sprayers which they are marketing-i6 
other farms. 
Some years ago, the dairy section was having difficulty in obtaining supplies of plastic 
ear tags for their heifers; one of the staff designed an impproved tag, and, as it 
happened, the Chairman had at the same time heard about a small plastic moulding unit 
which a nearby collective had established in order to provide winter employment for the 
women members. After some discussion and consultation with the membership, they 
decided to investigate the possibility of starting such a unit on the Bolshevik Farm, to 
manufacture the new ear tag, to provide employment, and, they hoped, to earn 
additional profits for the collective. 
It was difficult to obtain equipment or raw materials, since the new venture had not had 
any resources allocated to it under the plan. A refrigerator factory in Murom, however, 
happened to have one rather old injection moulding machine surplus to its requirements; 
this factory also produced more scrap material from rejected mouldings of refrigerator 
parts than it was able to re-process, so they were happy to sell the Bolshevik Collective 
a simple re-grinding machine together with the injection moulder, in order to obtain a 
market for their scrap materials. 
The unit started succeqsfully, making ear tags for the farm’s own cattle and for other 
customers; they then started to make plastic moulded cow combs, and, somewhat later, 
moved away from farm related products altogether when they were asked to make clear 
plastic lamp glasses by a factory making motor-cycles. By this time, the unit had been 
included in the plan allocations for equipment and raw materials; it now employs sixty 
women, working in three shifts, with a total of twenty small injection moulding 
machines. They make a range of components for factories in the region, as well as the 
agricultural products. The unit is still accommodated in some simple converted barns, 
but it has become an important source of profits for the collective as a whole. 
Out of the total sales of some eight million roubles, 1,700,OOO roubles are accounted for 
by the plastic moulding unit and the profits also amount to some twenty per cent of the 
total earnings of the collective. The capital invested in the unit is, however, far less than 
twenty per cent of the total, so in terms of return on investment, the plastic moulding 
enterprise is highly advantageous. 
When they started the unit, the managers acted very much on their own, with no official 
assistance; they were advised informally by the specialists from the refrigerator factory 
in Murom. There is now, however, a special advisory and marketing assistance unit at 
the district office in Vladimir, to help collective and state farms with this type of 
undertaking. The Bolshevik Collective makes some use of this in obtaining new 
contra-; but the actual direction of the enterprise remains firmly in the hands of the 
collective and its managers; the assistance unit is only there for them to use if they want 
it. 
‘The Policv Environment’ 
The plastic moulding unit at the Bolshevik Collective is not atypical, but I was able to 
observe and discuss a number of other non-farm activities; it is difficult to generalise, 
particularly because the very strength and interest of these activities lies in their 
individuality. There were nevertheless some common features which may be of interest, 
both because of their importance for the past and future development of this type of 
activity, and for the light they throw on the way in which both collective and state 
farms operate in the Soviet Union. 
My hosts conceded that the farms to which they took me were among the better in the 
respective districts, although they were not the best. None of their chairmen or managers 
admitted to any great problems in achieving their planned production quotas, which had 
to be sold to the state at lower than free market prices, although all accepted that this 
was naturally their first concern; if a collective fails to produce its quotas, the state will 
impose higher quotas for future years, and will bring pressure to bear in other less 
obvious ways. A state farm manager risks losing his job if his farm fails to produce the 
quota. Assuming that this level of production is achieved, however, both collective 
chairmen and state farm managers were agreed that their social and economic objectives 
were inextricably mixed. 
We are in capitalist societies used to the tension between the social goals of a 
community, such as full employment, and the economic goals of profitability, for 
reinvestment and for distribution to the stake holders. This tension also exists in 
collective and state farms in the Soviet Union, but because the farms are so large, being 
based in most cases on the pre-revolutionary feudal estates, they are at the same time 
communities and businesses. The examples which I visited were within around one hours 
drive from fairly large towns, but were nevertheless discrete in physical as well as 
economic terms; by happenstance rather than design, they were at the same time viable 
social and economic communities. The conflict still exists, but at least it is to an extent 
simplified because it is within one organisation, rather than being between separate 
organisations with conflicting goals. 
The chairmen and managers did not appear to consider themselves unduly constrained by 
external authorities. Once they had succeeded in persuading their members, or 
employees, of the wisdom of a new investment or other initiative, even if it involved 
moving into a quite different field, they had only to present a convincing case to the 
district authorities. None of the managers whom I met could recall an occasion when 
such an application had been refused, and the average approval time was apparently 
some two weeks. 
Such approval did not, of course, mean that they had guaranteed access to materials and 
equipment. The Soviet Union is a shortage economy, for most commodities; when a new 
activity is approved by higher authority, it is then eligible for inclusion in The Plan, 
through which supplies are allocated. It might take a year or even more for a simple 
injection moulder to be delivered, and the methods by which the Bolshevik Collective 
obtained its initial supplies of equipment and moulding polymer from the refrigerator 
factory in Murom were forced on them not by the difficulty of obtaining permission for 
the whols activity, but by the shortage of commodities. 
All the managers and chairmen felt that non-farm activities would expand in the future; 
one had plans for a small sausage factory to help members process pork from their 
private plots, another was planning to expand and diversify garment production and a 
third talked on specialised irrigation construction and other large scale contracting 
activities which would be carried out for farms and municipalities in the region and 
beyond. Unlike the central office authorities, they were aware of the trend towards 
greater capital intensity and were determined to maintain and if possible increase the 
population of the rural communities for which they were responsible. They were not 
anxious to recruit people from outside the community, and attempted whenever possible 
to plan for future manpower needs by sending young people from the community for 
specialised training in the field where they felt they would be needed. Outsiders were 
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recruited when necessary, but the main aim was to offer productive and satisfying 
employment to the “insiders”; this was consistent with the general aim to achieve self- 
sufficiency in welfare and social services, and generally to reduce their reliance on the 
state whenever possible. 
As has already been suggested, the district and the Moscow headquarters staff had rather 
different attitudes to non-farm activities. The Vladimir office maintained the small 
assistance office which has already been mentioned, and were able to provide me with 
some aggregate figures for their area. The equivalent office in Krasnodar, by the Black 
Sea, showed less interest, perhaps because the far shorter winter season demands less 
seasonal employment, and were unable to provide any data on the subject, although they 
had comprehensive information on almost every imaginable aspect of the farms for 
which they considered themselves responsible. 
On my arrival in the Soviet Union, I had a brief meeting in Moscow with the Director 
responsible for all collective farms in the Soviet Union, and on my departure I asked for 
a further meeting in order to find out more about the development of non-farm 
activities, which I had observed during my visits to Vladimir and Krasnodar Districts. 
Because of the short notice, he was only able to give me 15 minutes, but the actual 
meeting went on for over two hours, because the Director was so surprised and then 
irritated by my interest in the topic. He refused to accept that over-production could 
ever be a problem in the USSR, as it is in Western Europe and North America, and even 
referred to the possibility of export markets for sugar when I pointed out that sugar 
production had already reached the target level, and that sugar consumption per head 
was likely to decrease as it has in most industrialised countries. Given the present and 
likely world supply and demand situation for sugar, and the problems that the Soviet 
Union already has in absorbing Cuba’s production at well above world prices, this 
seemed somewhat unrealistic. 
The move towards locally initiated non-farm enterprises is not connected with the 
current efforts to promote restructuring and more local autonomy in Russian industry 
and society, but it may be that the somewhat blinkered attitude shown by central 
authority is inevitable given that the civil servants have not themselves usually worked 
in agriculture, and they have spent all their working lives attempting to cajole, coerce 
and encourage t::e agricultural sector to produce more and more of the basic crops. If 
the farms move further in the direction of diversified rural production enterprises, with 
reducing emphasis on crop production, the central planners and other authorities will 
become less and less relevant. It is already far from clear why there are separate 
administrative hierarchies for collective and for state farms; Gosagroprom may in time 
become little more than a gatherer of historic data, as the farms become ever more 
diversified and autonomous. 
Conclusiong 
In spite of past setbacks and disappointments, the Soviet Union is approaching self- 
sufficiency in most agricultural products; the food distribution and retailing system is 
currently perhaps the most obviously ineffective and disorganised aspect of the economy, 
at least to a casual observer from outside. This should in due course be improved, 
perhaps in part through the growth of small private shops which is forecast to take place 
when the Law on the Private Exercise of Trade, which was published in January 1987, 
and came into effect in May, starts to be acted upon. Such improvement may marginally 
increase demand for some farm commodities, but the country should be producing 
enough for its own needs well before the end of this century.The existence and growth 
10 
of non-farm enterprises actually undertaken on and by the farms themselves, may mean 
that the USSR will be able to avoid some at least of the problems of over-production 
and surplus disposal which have caused so many distortions in the EEC, through the 
operation of the Commor) Agricultural Policy. Agricultural surpluses, and their disposal, 
may be said to be one of the major causes of economic disagreement between trading 
blocs, and they have also inhibited the efforts of Third World policy makers to develop 
their own viable agricultural sector; it is to be hoped that the collective and state farms 
of the Soviet Union will not contribute further to this problem. 
The experience of the Soviet farms may also be of wider relevance; there are many 
reasons why community, collective or co-operative enterprises fail to function as 
effectively as those which are initiated and managed by indivduals or groups, primarily 
for profit, and the track record of such enterprises is far from impressive. Nearly every 
article on the subject refers to the Mondragon family of enterprises in northern Spain, 
because there are so few other examples of success. It may be that one of the reasons 
why some, at any rate, of the Soviet collectives have succeeded is that the boundaries of 
the enterprise and of the community are the same in both human and physical terms. It 
is perhaps unrealistic to look to collectivisation of whole rural communities as a solution 
to the over-production problems of the EEC, but there is little doubt that an integrated 
rural community, whether it is owned and managed by a collective or a benign private 
landowner, can respond more effectively to change than a community which is made up 
of a number of individual private farming units. 
The normal Western pattern is for community organisations, whether they are voluntary 
or official, to be concerned with social and administrative affairs, while business 
enterprise is in the hands of quite separate organisations. These may themselves be co- 
operatives, or publicly owned, but they are separate from the local authority, 
municipality, parish council or other body responsible for administration and social 
affairs. 
When the business enterprises contract or reduce their labour force, whether they be 
farms, steel mills, coal mines or textile mills, the community organisations are faced with 
the problems of attracting new enterprises from the outside, or attempting to help those 
who are out of work to start new businesses to employ themselves and their fellows. The 
shrinking older business may, in a few cases such as The British Steel Corporation, be in 
a position to help the community overcome the problems of change, but such assistance 
can never be as effective as when the business is the same entity as the community. 
Much is made of the importance of social responsibility for managers, but this must 
inevitably be peripheral to the main tasks of the enterprise, which are economic rather 
than social. Enterprise agencies, small firms starter schemes, or investment promotion 
campaigns can never have the same inpact as the efforts of a community which is itself 
a business. 
The “Company Town”, on the model of Bournville or New Lanark, is perhaps an 
outdated concept, since we have come to believe that the goals of a business enterprise 
must be different from and potentially in conflict with those of a community. A 
company need not always be engaged in the same industry, however, and successful 
companies survive by evolving, adapting and initiating change; one explanation for the 
decay of both rural and urban communities may be the lack of identity between the 
goals of the community and of the enterprises in which its people are engaged. There is 
currently some debate, in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, as to the most appropriate 
form and scale for business enterprise and for community organisations. It may be that 
there would be something to be gained by considering the two problems as one, and by 
searching for institutions which can manage both the economic and the social activities 
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of a community at the same time, and can simultaneously be responsive to the needs and 
aspirations of the people who live and work in them. 
Note: The visit referred to in this paper was undertaken under Article IV (1) (A) of 
the Anglo-Soviet Cultural and Scientific Agreement for 1986 to 1987. I should 
like to thank all those who made it so useful, including the British Council, the 
International Department of Gosagroprom, and, in particular, my interpreter, 
Ms Dulchinskaya, the staff of the District Offices in Vladimir and Krasnodar, 
and the Managers, Chairmen and other representatives of the farms and other 
institutions I visited. 
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